Models of Rationality & the Psychology of Reasoning


Vincenzo Crupi (Turin) gives a talk at MCMP. Abstract: Diagnoses of rationality and irrationality often arise from the experimental investigation of human reasoning. Relying on joint work with Vittorio Girotto, I will suggest that such diagnoses can be disputed on various grounds, and provide a classification. I will then argue that much fruitful research done with classical experimental paradigms was triggered by normative concerns and yet fostered insight in properly psychological terms. My examples include the selection task, the conjunction fallacy, and so-called pseudodiagnosticity. Conclusion: normative considerations retain a constructive role for the psychology of reasoning, contrary to recent complaints in the literature.

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