An explication of the most powerful objection to Bayesian Epistemology, the problem of the priors, and why if a Bayesian cannot solve this problem, they will be no more successful than the standard epistemist.
Read morein this series we will tackle some of the most powerful and convincing objections to Bayesian Epistemology, including, the immutability of logic, the problem of logical omniscience, the problem of uncertain evidence (and Jeffery Conditionalization), The Problem of Old Evidence, the problem of Prediction vs Accommodation, the problem of new theories, and the problem of […]
Read moreAn explication of the difference between subjective and objective Bayesianism, in Bayesian Epistemology.
Read moreA description of the New Paradox of Dogmatism for Bayesian Epistemology and a temporary solution to it.
Read moreA thought experiment exemplifying how certainty in Bayesian Epistemology is irrational.
Read moreAn explanation of how a given theory is confirmed or disconfirmed in Bayesian Epistemology.
Read more
Recent Comments